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CONSTITUTIONAL BRANDING
Michael J. Gerhardt*
I.

INTRODUCTION

When the Hofstra Law Review began over forty years ago, the
Senate had just rejected President Richard Nixon’s nominations of
Clement Haynsworth and Harold Carswell to the U.S. Supreme Court.1
In the ensuing years, Supreme Court selection does not appear to have
gotten easier. Three other Supreme Court nominations have failed;2 and
close votes in several other proceedings,3 along with the blockage of
dozens of lower court judicial nominations made by Presidents George
H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, 4 have
led most commentators to conclude that the federal judicial selection has
broken down.5
This Article examines an under-appreciated but significant dynamic
that both reflects and helps to explain the persistent contentiousness over
judicial nominations—the constitutional branding of judging in the
federal judicial selection process. The concept of “branding” is central to
the field of trademark law,6 in which it generally refers to coordinated
* Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law and Director of the UNC
Center on Law and Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A., Yale
University; M.Sc., London School of Economics; J.D., University of Chicago. I am very grateful to
both Cara Richards and Edward Roche, UNC Law School Class of 2014, for their excellent research
assistance.
1. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 15, 17 (3d ed. 1992).
2. Supreme Court Nominations, Present–1789, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited July 27, 2012).
3. Id.
4. DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31868, U.S. CIRCUIT AND
DISTRICT COURT NOMINATIONS BY PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH DURING THE 107TH-109TH
CONGRESSES 30 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31868.pdf; Mary Bruce,
White House Urges Senate GOP to Stop Blocking Judicial Nominees, ABC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012,
12:01 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03/white-house-urges-senate-gop-to-stopblocking-judicial-nominees/.
5. See, e.g., John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for
Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 191 (2003).
6. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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efforts to package, describe, and characterize commercial products or
services in ways that will appeal to consumers.7 “Constitutional
branding” refers to a similar form of collective action with respect to
judicial selection—namely, the organized or coordinated efforts to
characterize, package, categorize, stigmatize, describe, promote, and
demean particular nominees to the Supreme Court or their interpretive
approaches for various purposes, including mobilizing public support
for, or opposition to, particular Supreme Court nominations.8
Applying what we know about the branding of trademarks to the
Supreme Court confirmation process will greatly enrich our
understanding of how law and politics interact in the appointments of
Supreme Court justices. By vesting the authority over Supreme Court
appointments to presidents and senators, the Appointments Clause of the
U.S. Constitution both licenses and is premised on the expectation that
politics, in one form or another, will shape the nomination and
confirmation of Supreme Court Justices.9 The dominant narratives of the
Supreme Court appointments process emphasize the political factors that
influence senatorial decision-making on such nominations. At their best,
these narratives provide rich, detailed discussions and empirical analyses
of the different factors influencing presidential or senatorial actions
pertaining to Supreme Court nominations. Yet, these narratives are
incomplete because they largely overlook the mechanisms or means by
which national political leaders channel these factors, or take them into
account in Supreme Court selection. Branding is one such means.
In fact, brands perform many of the same functions in the Supreme
Court appointments process as they do in the commercial context. To
begin with, they serve as heuristics or the means by which key decisionmakers and opinion leaders signal to interested consumers important
information about the product: Supreme Court nominations. Just as
commercial branding mobilizes consumers to do certain things such as
investing in or purchasing certain products,10 constitutional branding
mobilizes or secures support or opposition within the Senate (if not also
within the electorate) to certain nominations. Just like commercial
brands, constitutional branding concerns more than selling a particular
commodity to interested consumers.11 It can signify a source or tell a
7. See DOUGLAS B. HOLT, HOW BRANDS BECOME ICONS: THE PRINCIPLES OF CULTURAL
BRANDING 2-3 (2004).
8. See infra Part III.
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 34 (8th ed. 2008).
10. Julie Manning Magid et al., Quantifying Brand Image: Empirical Evidence of Trademark
Dilution, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 9, 20-21 (2006).
11. Skeptics might raise two concerns about the utility of importing the concept of branding
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story; it can identify things and distinguish some things from other
things. Brands also change over time. Apple, for instance, used to be
well-known as the trademark for The Beatles’ record label;12 later it was
solely about a more hip kind of computer, and today it is about much
more. In fact, Apple is, inter alia, the largest distributor of music.13
Similarly, prior to the Civil War, the Democratic Party stood for the
principle of state sovereignty, but by the middle of the twentieth century
became known for both supporting significant expansions of national
authority and championing civil rights—positions that had been
associated with the Republican Party from the early days of its founding
until the 1920s.14 Constitutional brands are not any more stable or fixed
in what they convey than commercial ones; they are subject to similar
social, political, economic, and other developments that can change their
meaning or narratives. Last but not least, brands facilitate political
objectives. Branding can serve the political objectives of making
particular judicial nominations appealing, or unappealing, to a particular
set of consumers, including senators. From trademark law, we know that
brands are repositories of good will; they can symbolize quality or
reputation.15 Consequently, a study of constitutional branding
into the judicial selection process, though each turns on a misunderstanding of trademark law. First,
some people might be concerned that choosing Supreme Court nominees differs from choosing
products because doing the latter rarely involves making permanent choices or decisions for life. In
fact, people do purchase some brands for life, or with life-long ramifications, such as the colleges
they choose to attend or the religious faiths they choose to follow. Second, some people might be
concerned that the choices facing senators in confirmation proceedings are not similar to those
confronting consumers. The concern is that consumers usually make choices from two or more
alternatives, whereas senators do not. In fact, senators have several choices in every Supreme Court
confirmation proceeding: “buying” or approving the nominations pending before the Senate;
rejecting or delaying nominations in the hopes of preserving vacancies for presidents from their
parties to fill; endorsing particular judicial philosophies (or not) in the course of voting on particular
nominations; rejecting a series of nominees because senators prefer different nominees or want to
express disapproval of a particular brand, product, or president; or abstaining from, or avoiding,
making a choice about particular nominees. See generally DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 31989, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS: ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT,
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, AND SENATE (2005), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/50146.pdf (discussing the role of the Senate in the Supreme Court nomination
process).
12. Joel Rose, The Beatles’ Apple Records: 40 Years Later, NPR (May 14, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90437894.
13. Press Release, Apple, iTunes Store Top Music Retailer in the US (Apr. 3, 2008),
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/04/03iTunes-Store-Top-Music-Retailer-in-the-US.html.
14. See Judith A. Hagley, Massive Resistance—The Rhetoric and the Reality, 27 N.M. L.
REV. 167, 196-97 (1997); Marianne L. Engelman Lado, A Question of Justice: African-American
Legal Perspectives on the 1883 Civil Rights Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1123, 1124, 1151-52
(1995).
15. Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 176 (1949).
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illuminates the important connection otherwise missing in the literature
between the debates and posturing in the confirmation process and the
shaping or formation of public opinions about the Court, its decisions,
the judiciary, and the rule of law. Notably, focusing on branding further
illuminates how the Supreme Court confirmation process is designed to
filter out bad nominations rather than to ensure or mandate the
confirmation of a single brand of judging. Thus, branding is a principal
means by which political authorities, media elites, and others seek to
influence the choice or fate of Supreme Court nominations and the terms
of debate and outcomes of their confirmation proceedings.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part II, I compare and
contrast branding to two of the most popular, widely used methodologies
in social science to measure the efforts of public leaders to shape public
discourse about Supreme Court appointments. I identify what these
modes have in common, how they differ from each other, and their
respective strengths and weaknesses in illuminating the relationship
between how public leaders talk about or characterize justices, their
decisions, or their styles of judging. I also look at the public’s attitudes
about these things and the outcomes of Supreme Court confirmation
proceedings.
In Part III, I examine the relative merits of the three popular ways
of demonstrating the impact or role of constitutional branding in the
Supreme Court confirmation process. The first is quantitative. There are
several excellent social science studies of the impact or relevance of
different factors on public opinion and senators’ votes regarding
Supreme Court nominations. However, these studies fail to illuminate
many significant aspects of the confirmation process. Perhaps most
importantly, we lack empirical analysis of the relationship between
branding and the framing employed, public opinion, or how senators
perform in Supreme Court confirmation proceedings. The second
candidate for measuring constitutional branding is purely qualitative, by
which I mean describing or critically analyzing particular events or
patterns in the confirmation process. Qualitative accounts of branding
are the least satisfying because, to the extent they exist, they are usually
partisan-driven accounts of the process and otherwise fail to provide any
comparative analysis of competing brands. Comparative analysis is
important because it would show how the competition among brands
shapes their meanings and narratives. The third and perhaps best
candidate for explicating constitutional branding is the field of historical
institutionalism in the social sciences, which focuses on the patterns of
different institutions’ decision-making on Supreme Court nominations
over time. These patterns illuminate how these institutions both shape
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and are shaped by various political and social forces or concerns,
including branding. To date, legal scholars have rarely applied historical
institutionalism to the Supreme Court confirmation process. Social
scientists generally and historical institutionalists in particular have yet
to provide extensive, detailed analysis of the phenomenon of branding.
Institutions are particularly well designed to promote, or counteract, the
effects of different brands. Hence, historical institutionalism could
enrich our understanding of the Supreme Court confirmation process by
providing a series of case studies on how branding has been
systematically employed by presidents, senators, interest groups, and
media elites in particular proceedings, why, and to what effect.
The fourth and final Part consists of three case studies melding
historical institutionalism and empirical analysis to measure the use,
development, and impact of three brands on Supreme Court
confirmation proceedings. The brands are “strict construction,”
“umpiring,” and “real-world judging.” These brands provide useful case
studies, because they each exemplify different stages of branding: The
first, “strict construction,” is a good example of a timeless brand, much
like Harvard in the field of higher education or Coca-Cola in the market
of soft drinks. The second, “umpiring,” is an emerging brand that has
recently had some appeal and thus gained some favor and traction in the
relevant marketplace. The third brand, “real-world judging,” is brandnew, or a heuristic brand aspiring to become an appealing alternative to
the brands of “strict construction” and “umpiring.” These case studies
illustrate several aspects of constitutional branding. First, each has much
in common with commercial branding, including but not limited to its
appeal to certain constituencies, its provocation of rival or competing
brands, and its being subject to challenge as deceptive or misleading.
Second, each of these brands performs multiple functions. Among the
functions are signaling to various constituencies whether they should
support or oppose particular nominations, mobilizing the actual support
for or opposition to particular nominations, ruling out particular
nominations or styles of judging as unacceptable, and providing a basis
(or cover) for voting for or against a particular nomination. Third, there
is empirical data suggesting at the very least that branding was a
common factor in Senate voting in each of the four most recent Supreme
Court confirmation proceedings. Indeed, there appears to be nearly a one
hundred percent correlation between branding and the nominations of
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor,
and Elena Kagan. For example, senators who praised the brand of
“umpiring” voted in favor of Supreme Court nominees Roberts and
Alito, who purportedly embodied this brand, while senators who
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criticized this brand voted against Roberts and Alito. The records of
senators’ voting in each of the last four Supreme Court confirmation
proceedings indicate further that, in the rare circumstances in which
senators crossed party lines to vote for Supreme Court nominations
made by presidents from the opposition party, they largely avoided
negative branding. Instead, the senators tended to justify their votes on a
non-ideological basis, particularly their recognition of a president’s
entitlement to Senate deference to a nominee who had the requisite
qualifications for appointment to the Court.
The Article concludes that the persistence of branding suggests that
senators must think that it works. They think that it works because they
know that it has worked in other contexts. They think it has worked on
prior occasions in the confirmation process and that it produces the
effects that they want, including the signaling of a senator’s likely
position on a given nominee and the corresponding mobilization or
maintenance of support within key constituencies.
II. BRANDING AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
Though the politicization of Supreme Court appointments is widely
lamented, surprisingly little attention has been given to the means by
which national political leaders seek to coordinate public or other
support to influence outcomes in the confirmation process. In fact, the
Constitution clearly licenses the politicization of Supreme Court and
other judicial appointments.16 The Constitution expressly places formal
authority over Supreme Court appointments in national political
leaders,17 who will naturally take political considerations into account
and use all the political warrants at their disposal, including public
support, to influence the outcomes of Supreme Court confirmation
proceedings. Yet, scholars have rarely systematically examined the
connection between coordinated efforts to shape public attitudes or
leaders’ opinions about particular Supreme Court nominations and the
confirmation proceedings for those nominations.
In this Part, I define, compare, and contrast three possible ways to
measure this connection—labeling, framing, and branding. Each of these
methods is popular in different academic disciplines, and each seeks to
describe collective, concerted efforts to impress meanings on particular
16. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law . . . .”).
17. Id.
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persons, events, or things. The comparative analysis of these methods
illuminates their relative strengths and weaknesses in measuring the
impact of coordinated efforts to shape public perceptions, discourse,
rhetoric, or opinions about particular Supreme Court nominations on the
outcomes of the confirmation proceedings for those nominations.
A. Labeling
One likely alternative for measuring the connection between public
characterizations of a Supreme Court nominee’s likely judicial
philosophy and the outcomes of the confirmation proceedings for the
nominee is labeling, which has been studied at length by sociologists.18
Labeling refers to the process by which someone or some attribute is
characterized or categorized as a deviation from a trait or property
shared by, or reflected in, a group or social norm.19 Labeling purports to
describe the way a “social response to deviance can profoundly affect
how people are perceived and how they perceive themselves.”20 As an
academic exercise, labeling seeks to explain the resulting “patterns of
deviance” from a supposedly normal pattern of behavior.21 According to
labeling theorists, feedback from social interaction structures one’s view
of self.22 If a person is viewed as deviant (socially or otherwise), this
stigmatization “transforms one conception of self (normal) into another
(deviant).”23 Labeling might not only hurt people’s self-image, but also
might cause people to change their behavior to conform either to the
label or to the norm from which they have supposedly deviated.24
Labeling can suggest both to the persons labeled and to others that
deviants are different from the norm of society in values, tastes, or
preferences, and that interaction with the deviant(s) could be viewed as,
or produce, conforming behavior or guilt by association.25

18. See, e.g., Nanette J. Davis, Labeling Theory in Deviance Research: A Critique and
Reconsideration, 13 SOC. Q. 447, 451-52 (1972).
19. HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 9 (1963).
Sociologists refer to “labeling” as a process whereby some person(s) or group(s) confers a property
upon an entity, such that the entity’s identity is understood to include, or changes to embody, that
property. See, e.g., id.; DAVID MATZA, BECOMING DEVIANT 181 (1969); Davis, supra note 18, at
451.
20. ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY: A USER’S GUIDE TO
SOCIOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 167 (2d ed. 2000).
21. Id.
22. Davis, supra note 18, at 451-52.
23. Id. at 452.
24. Id. at 451-52, 454.
25. See id. at 454-55.
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Because the labeling theory developed around the formation of a
deviant, the current use of “labeling” in sociology has a negative
connotation.26 The purpose of a label is usually to create boundaries and
categories and thus to construct our social world by defining norms. 27
Labels are often used by public “[o]fficials, politicians, journalists,
activists and researchers . . . to help our analyses [of what they do] and
to describe to others what [they] do.”28 People label other people, or
events, in order to satisfy certain needs and to formulate solutions to
specific problems.29 Such categorization is an efficient, “dynamic and
political” way to try to identify how some person(s) have either deviated
from a social norm or, as a result of the labeling, can be moved to
conform to certain norms of behavior.30
An excellent example of labeling of judging is the characterization
of some judges or judicial decisions as “activist.”31 This label is
invariably pejorative and is meant to convey that a judge, justice,
judicial opinion, or nominee has deviated from preferred or normal
standards of judicial performance.32 Activists, by definition, are deviants
from normal judging.33
B. Framing
Another possible way to measure concerted efforts to influence
opinions, discourse, or outcomes in Supreme Court confirmation
proceedings is framing, which is widely studied in political science and
sociology.34 Framing refers to the strategic, organized efforts by groups
to create shared understandings of particular subjects in order to
motivate collective action.35 The concept of framing derives from the
26. See id. at 451; Michael Petrunik, The Rise and Fall of “Labelling Theory”: The
Construction and Destruction of a Sociological Strawman, 5 CANADIAN J. SOC. 213, 214 (1980).
27. Joy Moncrieffe, Labelling, Power and Accountability: How and Why ‘Our’ Categories
Matter, in THE POWER OF LABELLING: HOW PEOPLE ARE CATEGORIZED AND WHY IT MATTERS 1, 1
(Joy Moncrieffe & Rosalind Eyben eds., 2007).
28. Rosalind Eyben, Afterword: Changing Practice, in THE POWER OF LABELLING: HOW
PEOPLE ARE CATEGORIZED AND WHY IT MATTERS, supra note 27, at 177, 177.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial Restraint to the
Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 599-600, 617 (2002); see also Keenan D.
Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism”, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
1441, 1447, 1459, 1472-73 (2004) (discussing the history of the term “judicial activism” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
32. Kmiec, supra note 31, at 1466-67.
33. Id. at 1475-76.
34. Judith D. Fischer, Framing Gender: Federal Appellate Judges’ Choices About GenderNeutral Language, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 484-85 (2009).
35. Neal Caren, Political Process Theory, in 7 THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

2012]

CONSTITUTIONAL BRANDING

663

principle that meanings do not “automatically attach themselves
to . . . objects, events, or experiences . . . but arise, instead, through
interpretive processes mediated by culture.”36 In the context of political
discourse, framing “has to do with choosing the language to define a
debate and, more important, with fitting individual issues into the
contexts of broader story lines.”37 Social movements, their participants,
and their adversaries regularly use framing to unify or mobilize social
movements or counter-movements.38 In order to “construct a shared
frame,” people are likely to use a combination of methods, including
“media discourse,” “popular wisdom,” and “experiential knowledge.”39
Framing has become widely regarded as a central dynamic in
understanding the nature and course of social movements. Particularly
large social movements use master frames to similar effect, such as
“civil rights,” “women’s [rights],” or “affirmative action.”40
Labeling can sometimes be an “act of framing.”41 When a label
becomes successful and commonly used, those with alternative frames
find the term difficult to avoid. As one scholar suggests, “[t]hose with a
different frame may try to distance themselves from such a label by the
use of so-called and quotation marks, but if they want to communicate
their subject matter to a general audience, they will find it difficult to
avoid established labels.”42
Moreover, as James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira suggest in their
empirical analysis of public influence in the confirmation process,
“competing frames are typically available in the political marketplace,
and the battle for public support of the nominee is often, if not typically,
a battle of one frame against another.”43 They suggest further that, “in a
contentious confirmation [such as Justice Alito’s], the American people
confront two competing frames for evaluating nominees: the frames of
judiciousness [referring to the nominee’s ability to apply the law
neutrally or impartially to resolve particular disputes] and of ideology
and partisanship.”44
SOCIOLOGY 3455, 3456 (George Ritzer ed., 2007).
36. David A. Snow, Framing and Social Movements, in 4 THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF SOCIOLOGY 1780, 1780 (George Ritzer ed., 2007).
37. Matt Bai, The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 38.
38. WILLIAM A. GAMSON, TALKING POLITICS 7 (1992).
39. Id. at 117, 125.
40. Id. at 9 (discussing the frame of affirmative action); Snow, supra note 36, at 1781
(discussing the master frames of civil rights and women’s rights).
41. GAMSON, supra note 38, at 9.
42. Id.
43. JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS:
POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 70 (2009).
44. Id. at 65.
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C. Branding
Branding is another option for illuminating how political leaders
influence the rhetoric over, and outcomes in, Supreme Court
confirmation proceedings. To specialists in trademark law, branding
refers to the packaging of a product or service in such a way as to
convey particular information about it.45 The purposes of branding are
varied, and include, but are not limited to, serving as source identifiers
(informing consumers of the companies or people who produce
particular products), providing narratives about products (stories about
products that are appealing to consumers), serving as repositories of
meaning about particular products, signaling or conveying messages
about particular products, and creating or cultivating an identity for the
people who use or buy particular products.46
The significance of branding depends on a collective enterprise,
entailing the interaction of four different sets of people:
[C]ompanies [the mark owners], the culture industries, intermediaries
(such as critics and retail salespeople), and customers (particularly
when they form communities). . . .
....
Marketers often like to think of brands as a psychological
phenomenon which stems from the perceptions of individual
consumers. But what makes a brand powerful is the collective nature
of these perceptions; the stories have become conventional and so are

45. See Ben Kleinman, Luxury Markets, Antitrust, and Intellectual Property: An Introduction,
90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 742, 746 & n.17 (2008); see also Magid et al., supra note 10,
at 1 (“Trademark law now endorses the branding efforts of trademark owners.” (footnotes omitted)).
46. A brand affiliates a set of products with a single source. See Rogers, supra note 15, at 176,
182. The use of a brand acts as a repository of meaning about particular products, such that one
brand might be associated with dozens of products. See HOLT, supra note 7, at 3-4. Courts have
found it fit to protect the accumulated meaning of such brands by preventing their unauthorized use.
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1987) (“The threat of
tarnishment arises when the goodwill and reputation of a plaintiff’s trademark is linked to products
which are of shoddy quality or which conjure associations that clash with the associations generated
by the owner’s lawful use of the mark . . . .”). Recent marketing wisdom instructs companies to link
their products to consumers by aligning their brands with popular narratives. See, e.g., HOLT, supra
note 7, at 37-38 (“The brand is a historical entity whose desirability comes from myths that address
the most important social tensions of the nation.”). Brands thus appeal to the consumer in the sense
that the consumer’s identity might be enhanced by taking on the brand’s meaning. The identifying
aspect of branding is most interesting when the consumer equates purchase of the product with
participation in a political cause, such as the American Revolution (by purchasing beverages other
than tea) or simply going shopping during a depression. See Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and
the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 907-08 (2004) (“The history of American
marketplace activity includes many examples of specifically targeted consumption choices that
linked purchasing power with political causes.”).
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continually reinforced because they are treated as truths in everyday
47
interactions.

The fourth of these groups includes consumers, who are instrumental in
investing a particular brand with meaning before it can reflect pervasive
cultural salience.48
There are obvious analogues in the realm of Supreme Court
selection to the different groups who determine a brand’s significance in
the commercial context. The “mark owners”—the persons who have
ownership claims to particular brands49—are the political elites who
create or promote brands, including presidents who make Supreme Court
nominations, the officials who assist the president in making or
promoting the nominees, the media elite, and perhaps members of
Congress and the other political leaders who are interested in vindicating
or opposing particular styles of judging or judicial decisions. The
“culture industries” are the interest groups and the political parties, who
are invested in the meanings of particular brands and in applying
particular brands to the judiciary, nominees, justices, judges, or judicial
decisions. The “intermediaries” are the media and the Internet. The
“customers” include the Senate, the legal community, and the American
public. As the next Part suggests, branding may have comparative
advantages over labeling and framing in explaining the nature and
substance of conflicts over Supreme Court nominations.
III.

THE DYNAMIC OF CONSTITUTIONAL BRANDING

While labeling, framing, and branding have in common the fact that
they all seek to over-simplify a complex world and to steer collective
action, branding has some analytical advantages over both framing and
labeling. Branding is not limited in the ways in which either labeling or
framing are. Whereas labeling is strictly negative, branding and framing
are not; they can be positive or negative, i.e., they can fortify certain
notions or understandings and not just mark deviations from particular
norms.50 Framing generally pertains to large-scale social movements,
and thus requires or depends on a mass organization of people, whereas
labeling and branding do not; they can function on a broad or intimate

47. HOLT, supra note 7, at 3.
48. See id. For an article analyzing the importance of consumer investment to the value of a
trademark, see Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademarks, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427
(2010).
49. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, BASIC FACTS ABOUT TRADEMARKS 1 (2010).
50. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25, 35-42, 45; supra note 46 and accompanying
text.
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scale.51 Framing entails structuring or channeling a dialogue or debate,
but branding is not so limited, for it can do either the same thing or the
opposite—cut off, or curtail, debate or discussion.52 Moreover, branding
has a lexicon that readily applies what we know about public attitudes
and judging. For example, brands can produce rival or counter-brands,
such as “the living Constitution” as an alternative to “originalism,” or
“strict construction.”53 They can be challenged, just as commercial
advertising may be, as misleading, deceptive, or false, as was the case
with President George H.W. Bush’s characterization of Clarence
Thomas as “the best qualified” candidate to replace retiring Justice
Thurgood Marshall.54
There are many excellent examples of brands of judging. First,
“activist” is not just a pejorative label, but it can also frame debate and
be a negative or derogatory brand.55 It aims to characterize or categorize
a judge, justice, style of judging, or judicial decision as unprincipled or
grounded on personal or political preferences rather than the law.56
“Activism” is, as Stephanie Lindquist and Frank Cross have noted in
their recent, excellent survey of the intellectual origins of the brand and
the history of its practice or manifestation over time:
a loaded term, fraught with multiple meanings and politicized
connotations. . . . Nevertheless, concerns over judicial activism have
existed since the founding of the United States. For the most part,
those who decry activist decisions [or judges] focus on the judiciary’s
usurpation of political power from the elected branches, especially
when those judges render those decisions in accordance with their own
policy preferences.57

51. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25, 35-40, 45; supra note 46 and accompanying
text.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40, 45; supra note 46 and accompanying text.
53. See PETER ZAVODNYIK, THE AGE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION: A HISTORY OF THE
GROWTH OF FEDERAL POWER, 1789–1861, at 1 (2007); Richard Primus, Limits of Interpretivism, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 159, 173 (2009); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living
Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 694 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also infra text
accompanying notes 112-21.
54. O’BRIEN, supra note 9, at 78-80 (internal quotation marks omitted); Excerpts from News
Conference Announcing Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at A14; see also Editorial,
Justice Thomas: On What Basis?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1991, § 4, at 16 (“He is a competent though
recent judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington. But he is not, as President Bush so glibly
proclaims, ‘the best man for the job on the merits’ regardless of race.”); Excerpts from Senate
Debate on Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at A18 [hereinafter Excerpts from
Senate Debate] (“Judge Thomas is not the best qualified American to be on the Supreme Court, as
claimed by the President.” (emphasis added)).
55. See Kmiec, supra note 31, at 1466-67, 1473.
56. See id. at 1466-67, 1475-76.
57. STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 1 (2009).
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Second, Republican leaders over the past few decades have been
especially adept at contrasting what “activists” do to what principled
judges do—“interpreting law and not making law.”58 This brand is
meant to convey something positive, so that judges, justices, or judicial
decisions branded as appropriately “interpreting the law” are thought to
follow proper methodologies and be grounded legitimately in the law.59
Understood in this manner, the brand has been used effectively on behalf
of Republican nominees, since it captures for many people the essence
of what judges do.60 The promotion of this brand also serves to convey
that the judicial decisions with which conservatives or Republicans do
not approve, or the judges or justices whom they do not support, are
making law inappropriately—that they are legislating from the bench
rather than doing their duty to merely “interpret the law.”61
Third, the brand “judicial restraint” has always meant to convey
something positive about judging and the opposite of “activism,”62 but
the particular elements of the kind of judging qualified as “judicial
restraint” have not been fixed. Over the years, it has referred in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century to the opposite of economic due

For another recent take on the “activism” of the Court, see generally THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST
ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM ch. 6
(2004), pointing out the ways in which the Rehnquist Court actively exercised its power of judicial
review.
58. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 298-99, 337, 367 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(discussing the desires of Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush to nominate Justices
who were strict constructionists and would interpret, rather than make the law); see also Kmiec,
supra note 31, at 1471 (noting that President George W. Bush wanted to appoint people who
“interpret the law, not try to make law and write law” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
59. See Kmiec, supra note 31, at 1466-67 (stating that judges who try and make law rather
than interpret the law are ignoring controlling precedent and discounting stare decisis).
60. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 298-99 (stating that President Nixon successfully
appointed four Justices whom he felt would be conservative and take care of the Constitution rather
than impose their viewpoints on the American people); see also Robert Justin Lipkin, We Are All
Judicial Activists Now, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 181, 182 (2008) (“Both conservatives and liberals
demonize so-called ‘activist judges’ whenever it suits their purpose.”); Primus, supra note 53, at
160 n.3 (“[O]ne paradigmatic foil for the textualist judge is the activist judge who foists his own
values on an unwilling citizenry, and there is good reason to expect that activist judge to face a great
deal of public criticism . . . .”); Caprice L. Roberts, In Search of Judicial Activism: Dangers in
Quantifying the Qualitative, 74 TENN. L. REV. 567, 570 (2007) (“The partisan rhetoric of the
activism wars has been so successful that the A.B.A. Journal has reported that a majority of
Americans see a crisis of judicial activism.”); Martha Neil, Half of U.S. Sees “Judicial Activism
Crisis”: ABA Journal Survey Results Surprise Some Legal Experts, ABA J. EREPORT, Sept. 30,
2005, available at http://canadacourtwatch.com/Newpaper%20Articles/2005Sept30%20-%20Half%
20of%20US%20sees%20judicial%20activism%20crisis.pdf (finding that when judges infuse their
own values and ignore the law they should be criticized).
61. See Kmiec, supra note 31, at 1471.
62. See Gerhardt, supra note 31, at 593-95.
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process,63 deferring to democratic authorities such as legislatures,64
following original meaning in constitutional interpretation, and
committing to decide cases based on the law and not personal or political
preferences.65 By the time President George W. Bush came into office in
2001, Republicans had largely abandoned the brand of “judicial
restraint” in favor of having judicial nominees who were committed to
“interpret[ing] the law, not try[ing] to make the law.”66 These shifts in
the meaning of “judicial restraint” reflect a common dynamic in
branding—namely, that the narrative or the story associated with a
particular brand might change over time.
A fourth brand was “law and order” judges, through which
President Nixon meant to convey something both positive about the
nominees, and negative about the Warren Court that he had attacked in
his successful 1968 presidential campaign.67 On the one hand, the brand
was meant to suggest that Nixon’s judicial nominees would be
deferential to local authorities, including prosecutors and juries in
criminal cases, rather than sympathetic to criminal defendants.68 On the
other hand, it was meant to suggest that the Warren Court had been
irresponsibly allowing convicted criminals to go free.69
Last but not least, a brand that has been promoted in critical
response to some recent, liberal Supreme Court decisions is “American
exceptionalism.”70 This brand was advanced as a reference to, or
embodiment of, the view that the Constitution should be interpreted on
the basis of its original meaning and the unique American experiences
which gave rise to its drafting and which are undermined when justices
rely on foreign law to guide its interpretation.71 The brand of “American
exceptionalism” both symbolized and reinforced Justice Scalia’s harsh
criticisms of two Supreme Court decisions in which the majority had

63. See id. at 591-93.
64. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 79 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (“It is not the
function of this Court to disregard the will of Congress in the exercise of its constitutional power.”);
ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 222-23 (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s strongly held belief of judicial
restraint and deferral to the democratically elected legislature, as applied to economic as well as
social legislation).
65. Gerhardt, supra note 31, at 627 n.212.
66. Kmiec, supra note 31, at 1471.
67. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 14, 300-02 (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. See id. at 14, 301-02.
69. Id. at 301-02.
70. Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the
Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1345 (2006).
71. See id. 1405-12 (detailing the evolution of American constitutional law and linking it to
“American exceptionalism”).
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relied in part on foreign law in construing the Constitution.72 Proponents
of the brand contrast “American exceptionalism” with an activist
approach to judging that they believe relies on foreign law illegitimately
as a basis for interpreting the Constitution.73
Branding is a natural, if not inevitable, consequence of the design
of the Constitution, which vests the power over judicial selection to
presidents and senators,74 and which ensures, through the First
Amendment, robust debate over issues of political salience, including
judicial nominations, styles of judging, and judicial decisions.75 But, the
potency of branding judicial nominations, judicial decision-making, and
judicial nominees is likely to undermine the sophisticated understanding
of the law that Barry Friedman and Andrew Martin have urged social
scientists to use in modeling.76 Branding has the power to shape, and
thus to distort, public understanding of the law, particularly to lead the
public to think that judges or justices do not respect the values usually or
commonly associated with the rule of law.77 In ways that will complicate
or impede a general understanding of the judicial function, branding may
blur the distinction between judges and non-judicial officials; and it may

72. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 626-28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Roper, Justice Scalia added:
The Court’s parting attempt to downplay the significance of its extensive discussion of
foreign law is unconvincing. “Acknowledgment” of foreign approval has no place in the
legal opinion of this Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court’s judgment—which
is surely what it parades as today.
Id. at 628.
73. See Calabresi, supra note 70, at 1398, 1412 (finding a “tendency of Americans to view
defining the Constitution as central to defining America’s exceptional mission in the world,” so that
“for the Court to follow obscure implications of caselaw . . . outrages the public”).
74. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The president] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law . . . .”).
75. See U.S. CONST., amend. I.
76. See generally Barry Friedman & Andrew D. Martin, Looking for Law in All the Wrong
Places: Some Suggestions for Modeling Legal Decision-Making, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH
IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 143 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed.,
2011) (detailing the inherent difficulty in modeling law due to differing courts, dynamic precedent,
and the difference between an outcome of a case and a court-drafted opinion).
77. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” As a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1997). Fallon identifies the most popular conception of the rule of law by
comparing the notion of the rule of law with the rule of men:
Within perhaps the most familiar understanding of this distinction, the law—and its
meaning—must be fixed and publicly known in advance of application, so that those
applying the law, as much as those to whom it is applied, can be bound by it. If courts
(or the officials of any other institution) could make law in the guise of applying it, we
would have the very ‘rule of men’ with which the Rule of Law is supposed to contrast.
Id.
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suggest a clearer, more precise distinction between law and politics than
might actually be the case in practice.78 Branding has the further effect
of obscuring the fact that in practice, the federal appointments process
tends to filter out really bad nominations as opposed to ensuring or
mandating any single brand of judging. The Constitution makes possible
and legitimizes a process for filtering brands, a process in which there is,
or at least can be, a vigorous debate infused with politics, however
defined, over judicial independence and accountability.79
The fact that the First Amendment protects branding in both
commercial and political contexts provides an additional basis for
analogizing the branding of products to the branding of nominations. To
be sure, the First Amendment does not provide as much protection to
commercial speech as it does to political speech; it allows regulation of
misleading, false, or deceptive advertising,80 even though it vigorously
protects political hyperbole unless it is directed at inciting imminent
lawless behavior and it is likely to produce or incite such lawless
behavior.81 Nevertheless, the First Amendment ensures a wide swath for
both the advertising of products and counter-advertising for competing
products.82 Even more so in the political context, the First Amendment
ensures that the contending sides in fights over Supreme Court
nominations have considerable latitude to exploit deceptive, misleading
brands in their cause and to seek to thwart such branding through
counter-advertising.83 The First Amendment further ensures robust
political advocacy on the part of political leaders, interest groups,
academics, and citizens about what judges do.84 It allows, in other
words, the branding of politically salient judicial decisions such as Roe
v. Wade.85 Brands can therefore be used to signal approval of, or to
78. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1679-83 (2004) (positing that judicial independence is simply what
remains after the interplay between Article III protections of the judiciary and congressional efforts
to influence the judiciary); Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 315, 339-40 (1999) (arguing that judicial independence “is not an operative legal
concept, but rather a way of describing the consequences of legal arrangements”).
79. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see, e.g., Excerpts from Senate Debate, supra note 54, at
A18 (stating that the Senate need not be a rubber stamp of a nominee and has a right to debate about
and reject nominees).
80. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of NY, 447 U.S. 557, 562-64
(1980).
81. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
82. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 561-64.
83. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
84. See id. at 14-15.
85. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils
of Constitutional Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 535 (2008) (describing prochoice scholars branding the Roe decision as one decided with poor legal reasoning).
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denigrate, particular judges, styles of judging, or judicial decisions. The
next Part examines the prevalence of, and political purposes motivating,
three popular brands of judging.
IV.

THREE POSITIVE BRANDS

In this Part, I examine in some detail three brands of judging that
have been employed (and criticized) in one or more of the three last
Supreme Court confirmation hearings and in public commentaries on
judges, judging, and judicial decisions since John Roberts’s appointment
as Chief Justice in 2005. These brands are “strict construction,”
“umpiring,” and “real-world judging.” Each of these is meant to be a
positive brand of judging (i.e., to rally support for a particular nominee,
construction of the Constitution, or judge or justice); each purports to be
neutral, as well as superior to, and more principled than, a rival or
competing brand; and each has been open to the challenge of being
deceptive or misleading. Moreover, each has been employed in public
rhetoric or debates about judging; none appear in any official opinion of
any justice since the advent of the Roberts Court.86 The fact that the
justices do not use them suggests that they prefer to use a different
language in their opinions than that which is used in political debates or
forums about judging. Justices apparently conceive of their functions as
different from that of politicians, interest group leaders, pundits, or
others who are seeking to achieve or shape outcomes in the political
process. These brands are used, in other words, purely for political
purposes, which have ramifications for public understanding of, and
public confidence in, judging.87

86. A LexisNexis search for “umpire” or “real-world judging” within Supreme Court opinions
since October 3, 2005 (when Chief Justice Roberts’s term began) produced no results. The term
“strict construction” appeared in only four Supreme Court opinions.
87. We can measure the prominence (or frequency) of some branding in Senate hearings,
floor statements, presidential statements, and public discourse (e.g., newspapers, radio, network and
cable television); however, the traction of branding might depend on other factors, such as the
strength of a particular nominee’s professional credentials, the composition of the Senate, and
whether the same party controls the White House and the Senate. Nor, of course, can anyone prove
a negative, so it is impossible to show that a nomination would have fared differently if there had
been different branding. Nevertheless, we can infer from its use throughout history that branding is
important to political leaders, just as it is important to the owners of trademarks. So, it is possible
that the frequency of branding in the public statements of presidents and senators on particular
nominees or judicial decisions might reflect that they think it is important to either a nomination’s
fate or to the institutional and public support that a judicial decision might need to endure. It is also
possible that the potential of branding to influence outcomes turns, as I have suggested, on other
things, such as an audience or constituency, particularly in the Senate, that is open to—and has the
power to act on—the messages conveyed by the branding.
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A. Strict Construction
“Strict construction” is one of the most popular and enduring
brands of judging in American history. The brand was initially employed
by the founders of the Republican Party, particularly Thomas Jefferson
and James Madison.88 The brand continued to be used by subsequent
presidents who purported to be following their philosophies, including
Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren, John Tyler, Franklin Pierce, and
James Buchanan.89 In this era, these presidents successfully nominated
to the Court seventeen people whom they or their supporters described
as “strict constructionists.”90 This brand was distinct from, and offered
as an alternative to, the Federalist brand of judging closely associated
with the Marshall Court’s broad constructions of federal power at the
expense of state sovereignty.91 The brand of “strict construction” took
hold in part because Presidents Jefferson, Madison, and James Monroe
were popular, two-term presidents92 whose political party dominated the
Senate during their respective tenures.93 Consequently, their nominees
faced little opposition of consequence.94 Andrew Jackson, next, fought
fierce battles to ensure the appointments of his “strict constructionists”
88. ZAVODNYIK, supra note 53, at 131, 198.
89. Id. at 177, 187, 300, 309-10; Martin Van Buren, 8th Vice President (1833–1837), U.S.
SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/VP_Martin_VanBuren.htm
(last visited July 27, 2012).
90. Supreme Court Nominations, Present–1789, supra note 2; see also ABRAHAM, supra note
1, at 96-100, 104, 107, 113-14 (describing the views and beliefs of the Court nominees).
91. See ZAVODNYIK, supra note 53, at 1-2, 104-05 (“Americans embraced strict
constructionism in order to ensure that Congress would exercise only those powers that had been
granted to it with the ratification of the Constitution—the remaining prerogatives of government
were to remain with the states.”); see also Resolves of the Legislatures of New York, in STATE
PAPERS ON NULLIFICATION 131, 136 (Boston, Dutton & Wentworth 1834) (“The Committee are
advocates for the reserved rights of the States, and a strict construction of the Constitution of the
United States.”); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES app. Note D, at 152. According to
Blackstone:
Since each state in becoming a member of a federal republic retains an uncontrolled
jurisdiction over all cases of municipal law, every grant of jurisdiction to the
confederacy, in any such case, is to be considered as special, inasmuch as it derogates
from the antecedent rights and jurisdiction of the state making the concession, and
therefore ought to be construed strictly, upon the grounds already mentioned.
Id.
92. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 51, 67; American President: Biography of James Madison,
MILLER CENTER, http://millercenter.org/president/madison/essays/biography (last visited July 27,
2012);
American President: Biography of James Monroe,
MILLER CENTER,
http://millercenter.org/president/monroe/essays/biography (last visited July 27, 2012).
93. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 51; Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited July 27,
2012).
94. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 85-92; Supreme Court Nominations, Present–1789, supra
note 2.
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to the Court.95 While in 1835 the Senate refused to confirm his advisor
and Attorney General Roger Taney as Associate Justice,96 his success,
shortly thereafter, in appointing Taney as Chief Justice,97 revived the
brand’s vitality.98
Subsequent nominees, branded as “strict constructionists,” faced
stiff opposition in the antebellum era. Hence, President Tyler’s use of
the brand did little to help his nominees.99 Tyler was hugely unpopular in
the Senate because the Whigs hated him for abandoning their Party’s
principles during his short presidency.100 This undermined his nominees
among senators who did not like Tyler, while the Whigs, who controlled
the Senate, wanted to preserve the vacancies for the next president.101
The Senate rejected or otherwise blocked eight of Tyler’s nine
nominations to the Supreme Court.102 The only nomination of his that
the Senate approved was of a Democrat, Samuel Nelson, who was
widely admired and was not known as a “strict constructionist.”103
Moreover, by the time that James Buchanan was elected president,
“strict construction” had become increasingly linked to supporting the
slave power,104 so that the narrative and positive images associated with
the brand were eroding. Hence, the Senate approved Buchanan’s only
nomination to the Court, Nathan Clifford, a “strict constructionist” who
had defended slavery, by one of the slimmest margins in American
history.105 One of the ensuing casualties of the Civil War and
Reconstruction was the positive meaning associated with “strict
construction.”106 President Abraham Lincoln’s election, and the rise of
the Republican Party, reflected a movement away from “strict
construction”—a move that was already developing at the time of the
razor-thin confirmation of Justice Clifford—to the appointments of
justices who were not hostile to federal power or reflexively protective
95. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 98-101.
96. Id. at 99-100.
97. Id. at 99-101.
98. See id. at 101.
99. Id. at 40; ZAVODNYIK, supra note 53, at 187.
100. Louis C. James, Senatorial Rejections of Presidential Nominations to the Cabinet: A
Study in Constitutional Custom, 3 ARIZ. L. REV. 232, 241-47 (1961) (“[Clay] viewed those who
supported the President as ‘a low, vulgar and profligate cabal.’”).
101. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 106-07; Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present,
supra note 93.
102. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 106-07; Supreme Court Nominations, Present–1789, supra
note 2.
103. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 107 (Justice Nelson “serve[d] diligently and perceptively for
almost three decades—generally in a manner anticipated by, and pleasing to, the Jacksonians.”).
104. Id. at 113; ZAVODNYIK, supra note 53, at 299.
105. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 114.
106. See id. at 114, 116.
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of state sovereignty.107 The brand fell into relative disuse until Presidents
William Howard Taft and Warren Harding revived it to signal their
Supreme Court nominees’ commitment to upholding property rights and
skepticism of progressive economic regulations.108 The brand became
more popular with Richard Nixon, who used it to distinguish the
ideological commitments of his nominees from the “liberal activism” of
the Warren Court109—symbolized by Brown v. Board of Education110
and other cases favoring minority rights and the rights of criminal
defendants at the expense of state sovereignty.111
The most prominent efforts made in recent years to brand nominees
positively as “strict constructionists” were made by President George W.
Bush in the run up to, and near the time he was nominating, Chief
Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito. President Bush used the
brand to convey that his nominees were committed to following a
different path than the liberal activists on the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts—namely to construe congressional powers narrowly, to oppose
or weaken abortion rights, and to allow more religion into public life.112
Yet, it is possible that the brand of “strict construction” did not
enrich or fortify public understanding of, or confidence in, judging for
several reasons. First, the purpose of the brand has never been to
improve or refine public understanding of judging. To the contrary, it
107. See id. at 117, 120, 123, 125; Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, supra note 93.
108. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 166-69, 186.
109. See Gerhardt, supra note 31, at 625-26; see also Editorial, The Symbols of a Nomination,
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1970, at A18. The editorial noted that:
This nod has been underlined by the stress the White House has put on the attitude of
mind it describes as “strict constructionist” and finds in both Judge Carswell and Judge
Haynesworth. That phrase, whatever it may actually mean, implies in the South
opposition to the Supreme Court’s desegregation rulings and its use seems certain to
encourage those who still think it is possible to shout, “Never.”
Id. Nixon promised to appoint:
“[s]trict constructionists” who would see “their duty as interpreting law and not making
law”; who would follow a “properly conservative” course of judging that would, in
particular, protect society’s “peace forces” against the “criminal forces”; and who would
“see themselves as caretakers of the Constitution and servants of the people, not
superlegislators with a free hand to impose their social and political viewpoints upon the
American People.”
Gerhardt, supra note 31, at 625-26.
110. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
111. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 258-61.
112. Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555, 55766 (2010) (describing the origins of the popularity of judicial deference among conservative
politicians and observing political motivations behind its use as a brand); Bush: No Moderate
Judges, NEWSDAY (Nassau), Mar. 29, 2002, at A16 (“Bush said he wanted to appoint strict
constructionists who would hew closely to the law rather than judicial activists whom he said were
prone to ‘legislate from the bench.’ ‘We want people to interpret the law, not try to make law and
write law,’ he said.”).
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has always been a code aimed at signaling nominees’ narrow
constructions of federal powers, most individual rights claims, and broad
constructions of state sovereignty and private property claims. 113 Hence,
it is meant to appeal only to certain constituencies, but not to a mass
audience or the American people generally. Second, the narrative of
“strict construction” is not perfectly positive.114 “Strict construction” has
been associated over the years, and been widely understood to be aligned
with, some divisive or problematic positions in constitutional law, such
as the constitutional entitlements of slave-owners and the right to
contract115 and opposition to the individual rights claims of homosexuals
or women seeking to terminate their pregnancies.116 Promoting this
brand—pushing it too strongly—runs the risk of mobilizing the
opposition forces to a “strict constructionist” reading of the Constitution.
Third, with a solid majority of fifty-five Republicans in the Senate, and
little or no meaningful prospect of a Democratic filibuster, President
Bush and Republican senators had little or no incentive to expand on the
particulars of the judicial philosophies of the President’s nominees or to
align Roberts or Alito with the historically problematic narrative of
“strict construction.”117 In Roberts’s confirmation hearings, Senator
Lindsay Graham was the only Republican member of the Judiciary
Committee to mention “strict construction” more than once (a total of
four times), while Senator Orrin Hatch used it once.118 In the Alito
hearings, only two Republicans on the Committee mentioned “strict
construction.”119 There was nothing Democrats could do to stop these
nominations without the nominees or the White House making some
113. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 112, at 564.
114. In a LexisNexis search of law reviews published since 2005, I determined that “strict
construction” of the Constitution, as an approach to judging, has been mentioned twenty-five times,
thirteen of which were critical or negative references. While law reviews hardly influence or inform
public discourse, these figures reflect the fact that the brand triggers or provokes relatively strong
negative responses in some constituencies which have an interest in the quality of judging or
judicial selection.
115. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 101-02.
116. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605-06 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172-73, 177 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
117. Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, supra note 93; Supreme Court Nominations,
Present–1789, supra note 2.
118. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 35, 37, 251 (2005)
[hereinafter Roberts Hearing] (statement of Sen. Lindsey O. Graham); id. at 158 (statement of Sen.
Orrin G. Hatch).
119. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong., 35, 429 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Hearing] (statement of Sen. Lindsey O. Graham); id.
at 465 (statement of Sen. Samuel D. Brownback).
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serious mistakes, but they did not. Democrats were unable to raise the
profile or salience of the brand through a contest; and the White House,
Republican senators, and the nominees were not disposed to be obliging.
Instead, in these hearings, Republican senators kept the attention off the
brand “strict construction” and emphasized instead the professional
accomplishments of the nominees and their characters.120 The fact that
the focus was elsewhere in the Roberts hearing was not a problem for
“strict construction,” because the hearings were not meant to be a
referendum on “strict construction.” In fact, the stage was being set for
the emergence of a new brand, one that would grab the attention of the
public and the media and arguably make the brand “strict construction”
seem irrelevant. It is to this new brand that I turn in the next section.
B. Umpiring
Both before and after his nomination as Chief Justice, John Roberts
never embraced the brand of “strict construction.” Instead, at the outset
of his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Chief Justice
Roberts described his approach to judging as akin to “umpiring.”121
Previously, “umpiring” had not been promoted as a brand of judging in
any political or public forum, but Republican senators quickly rallied
behind the brand: six Republicans on the Judiciary Committee
mentioned the brand positively (or at least neutrally) sixteen times
during Roberts’s hearings,122 and Republicans referenced the brand
sixty-two times in the hearings and on the Senate floor.123 These
120. See Alito Hearing, supra note 119, at 10, 336-37 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch)
(emphasizing Alito’s character, reputation, and professional accomplishments); id. at 14 (statement
of Sen. Charles E. Grassley); id. at 18-20, 372 (statement of Sen. Jon L. Kyl); id. at 28-29
(statement of Sen. Jefferson B. Sessions); Roberts Hearing, supra note 118, at 165 (statement of
Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (emphasizing Roberts’s character and professional accomplishments); id. at
201-03 (statement of Sen. Jon L. Kyl); id. at 229-30 (statement of Sen. Jefferson B. Sessions); id. at
249-50 (statement of Sen. Lindsey O. Graham); id. at 265 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn).
121. Roberts Hearing, supra note 118, at 55 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
122. Id. at 31, 237, 353, 523 (statement of Sen. Jefferson B. Sessions); id. at 46 (statement of
Sen. Samuel D. Brownback); id. at 161 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch); id. at 177 (statement of
Sen. Charles E. Grassley); id. at 195 (statement of Sen. Jon L. Kyl); id. at 266-67 (statement of Sen.
John Cornyn).
123. Id. at 31, 237, 353, 523 (statement of Sen. Jefferson B. Sessions); id. at 46 (statement of
Sen. Samuel D. Brownback); id. at 161 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch); id. at 177 (statement of
Sen. Charles E. Grassley); id. at 195 (statement of Sen. Jon L. Kyl); id. at 266-67 (statement of Sen.
John Cornyn); 151 CONG. REC. 20,891–92 (2005) (statement of Sen. Alan W. Allard); id. at 21,191,
21,648 (statement of Sen. William H. Frist); id. at 21,207 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch); id. at
21,279-80, 21,408 (statement of Sen. Jefferson B. Sessions); id. at 21,295 (statement of Sen. Kay B.
Hutchinson); id. at 21,389 (statement of Sen. Gordon H. Smith); id. at 21,399 (statement of Sen.
Conrad R. Burns); id. at 21,404-05 (statement of Sen. James M. Talent); id. at 21,407 (statement of
Sen. David B. Vitter); id. at 21,407 (statement of Sen. James P. Bunning); id. at 21,417 (statement
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references helped to raise the salience of the brand, which was reported
at least once in every major newspaper story on the hearings and every
major television and radio broadcast of the hearings.124 Since the
hearings, the brand seems to have retained some cultural significance or
prominence, as reflected in the facts that a LexisNexis search of law
reviews published after 2005 indicated that the term had been used
twenty-five times (sixteen since 2008),125 and was mentioned at least
once in stories on judging published in every major newspaper during
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings in the summer of
2009.126
“Umpiring” has had strong appeal as a brand for several reasons.
First, it has resonated with much of the public’s likely understanding of
the importance of impartiality in judging and the constitutional ideal of
neutrality as an indispensable attribute of judges. Like umpires, judges
are supposed to be neutral and not play favorites among the parties who
appear before them. The brand of “umpiring” therefore neatly fits into a
positive narrative of judging that is likely to have appeal to most people.
Umpires are not supposed to be biased toward a party or to favor a
particular outcome, and the same can be said of ideal judges. Umpires
merely call the balls and strikes as they see them (as Roberts said in his
confirmation hearings).127 They stand apart from the game, are not
invested in the outcome of the game in any way, and are otherwise
uninvolved with—indeed, loathe to interfere at all with—the game.
Third, the positive narrative of “umpiring” has reinforced, and is
reinforced by, another brand popular among Republicans and

of Sen. Robert F. Bennett); id. at 21,425 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley); id. at 21,631
(statement of Sen. Chester T. Lott). These figures and the figures that I cite from later Supreme
Court confirmation hearings are based on my readings of the transcripts of the Committee hearings
and Senate floor debates on the Roberts, Alito, and Sotomayor nominations. In addition, my
research assistants employed LexisNexis searches of major newspapers, broadcast transcripts, and
law reviews to determine the numbers of times that the terms “strict construction,” “activism,”
“activist,” “umpiring,” “empathy,” and “real-world judging” were used. In our determinations of the
numbers of times that references were made to “real-world judging,” we treated references made to
“real-world” as synonymous. We did not, for the sake of precision, count as synonymous to “realworld judging” references made to “realistic” or “reality-based” judging. There were only a few
references made to each of the latter two, so the inclusion or exclusion of these was not likely to
throw off the final tally significantly in one direction or another.
124. See, e.g., Robert Schwartz, Op-Ed., Like They See ’Em, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at A37
(criticizing the brand in a commentary on the nomination of Harriet Miers).
125. A LexisNexis search for “umpir!” in the “US Law Reviews and Journals, Combined”
database, from January 1, 2006 to July 2, 2012, yielded these results.
126. See, e.g., Bruce Weber, Umpires v. Judges, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009 (Week in Review),
at 1.
127. Roberts Hearing, supra note 118, at 56 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
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conservatives—“interpreting, not making the law.”128 This mutual
reinforcement, or cross-branding, has fortified the positive narrative that
many Republicans and political conservatives hoped that the brand
would embody.
In spite of the strong endorsements that “umpiring” as a brand has
received from some senators and pundits in public discourse about
judging,129 it possibly undermines public understanding of judging in
several ways. First, it arguably gets umpiring wrong. Umpiring is not, as
the narrative with which it is associated might suggest, merely
mechanical, but involves substantial discretion. Indeed, umpiring might
involve more discretion than judging. As one professional umpire argued
in a widely read editorial published at the outset of Justice Sotomayor’s
confirmation hearings, the strike zone does not stay the same in every
game; it changes every game because of the umpire, who has the
discretion to define and to enforce it.130 The strike zone is what the
umpire says it is. In contrast, the Constitution at least remains written
and amendable only in accordance with its strict procedures.131 Its
written declarations—and meaning—are not supposed to change from
case to case. Moreover, judging is not purely mechanical; it does not
entail blindly or mindlessly applying a set of rules to a legal dispute. The
cases that come before the Court tend to be the ones in which the
interpretive rules are in dispute, or the law is in dispute or does not point
to a single or easy answer. In addition, the brand of “umpiring” is
arguably deceptive, because it masks the real agendas or ideological
commitments of the judges who claim to be nothing more than neutral
umpires. The fact is that judges and justices might be invested in
particular interpretive methodologies that have little or no suitable
counterpart in baseball. Fourth, the brand is meant to curtail any
extended discussion of judging. The immediate, intuitive appeal of this
brand is its point. Last but not least, justices do not stand apart from
legal disputes in the same way that umpires stand apart from baseball.
Umpires are not players in the game of baseball, but judges and justices
are one of the principal constitutional authorities in the scheme of checks
and balances set forth in the Constitution.132 Hence, judges and justices
are often called upon to determine the scope of their powers and the
128. See Comments by President on His Choice of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1990, at A18
(quoting President Bush describing Justice Souter as “committed to interpreting, not making the
law”).
129. Michael P. Allen, A Limited Defense of (at Least Some of) the Umpire Analogy, 32
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525, 530 (2009).
130. Weber, supra note 126.
131. See Rehnquist, supra note 53, at 705.
132. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
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powers of the other branches, and what they say about the Constitution
is, by design, extremely difficult to undo. In contrast, disputes over the
powers of umpires are appealable to higher authorities, which are able to
make changes to the rules of the game of baseball more easily than they
may be made to the Constitution.133
However, the full impact of “branding” outside the confirmation
process is unclear. First, the brand might retain some vitality,
particularly in some quarters (as shown in Republican statements during
the Sotomayor hearings),134 but it could possibly not have as much as it
could have had. Only a few months after Chief Justice Roberts’s
confirmation, Justice Alito refused to use any label in describing his
approach to judging.135 In the proceedings on Justice Alito’s nomination,
Republican senators mentioned “umpiring” positively only five times
during Judiciary Committee hearings136 and only four other times on the
Senate floor.137 In less than three years after his confirmation, Chief
Justice Roberts seems to have distanced himself from the brand and
fallen back on more broadly appealing, sophisticated descriptions of the
judicial function in public statements.138 Second, no justice has made
references to the brand in any of their opinions on the Supreme Court.139
The fact that the justices themselves do not usually employ brands in
their opinions in all likelihood reflects their shared understanding of
judicial opinion-writing as a different enterprise than policy-making.
133. See Rehnquist, supra note 53, at 705.
134. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to Be an Associate Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7, 137 (2009)
[hereinafter Sotomayor Hearing] (statement of Sen. Lindsey O. Graham) (reflecting Republican
senators referencing the brand by way of using the terms “balls and strikes”).
135. Senator Sam Brownback said to then-Judge Alito, “I just want to get your thoughts of
how you view the Constitution . . . . [t]here are these different schools of thought on this of strict
constructionist, living document, originalist, and there are several others that float around out there.
How do you generally look at the Constitution?” Alito Hearing, supra note 119, at 465 (statement of
Sen. Samuel D. Brownback). Alito failed to designate a specific label to his method of judging. Id.
136. Id. at 10 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch); id. at 14 (statement of Sen. Charles E.
Grassley).
137. 152 CONG. REC. 48, 211, 348 (2006) (statement of Sen. Jefferson B. Sessions); id. at 60
(statement of Sen. Mel Martinez); id. at 167 (statement of Sen. James M. Talent); id. at 169
(statement of Sen. David B. Vitter).
138. See, e.g., CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, 2007 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
3-4 (2008), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2007year-endreport.pdf;
Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional
Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1077 (2006); Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Humility,
76 U. CIN. L. REV. 23, 46-47 (2007); Roberts, supra note 60, at 570 (criticizing Roberts’s use of
“umpire[]” for being an overly simplistic criticism against those “activist” judges who unfairly
“control the outcome of the game by altering the strike zone” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
139. A LexisNexis search for “umpire” (or “umpir!”) within Supreme Court opinions since
2005 (the year Chief Justice Roberts’s term began) produced no results.
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Brands are partisan; they are not judicial rhetoric about judging. Third, it
is unclear how much the public is listening to, or being influenced by,
the promotion of “umpiring” as a brand of judging. It is possible that the
people who watch or follow Supreme Court confirmation proceedings
already have fixed views about the nominee or judging. Moreover, the
public might discount political rhetoric about particular judges or
judging, or have different opinions about the quality of the judiciary or
judging generally than they do about particular justices or decisions. It
might also be true that branding might simply appeal to the faithful party
as opposed to the public at large. But, if branding has little or no sway
on public opinion about, or confidence in, judging, we should find out
the factors that do influence public confidence in judging. Fourth, the
relative absence of criticisms of the brand of “umpiring” in the Alito
hearings (Democratic senators mentioned it only five times)140 did not
necessarily inure to the benefit of the brand. Instead, during and after the
Alito hearings, Democratic senators sounded themes they rolled out in
2009 as a rival, competing brand of judging. In the next section, I
consider the possible significance of the emergence of a rival brand to
“umpiring.”
C. Real-World Judging
In the weeks leading up to his first Supreme Court nomination,
President Barack Obama emphasized that he wanted his nominee to have
“empathy” and to understand how the law worked “in the real world.”141
Although the President might have meant for these terms to merely
describe the qualities that he would like for his Supreme Court nominee
to have, “empathy” and “real-world” could be construed as sub-brands,
or as falling within a house brand. The house brand could have been
Democratic or President Obama’s judges or Justices. More specifically,
“empathy” conveyed at least two things about President Obama’s
Supreme Court nominee—one positive and the other negative. On the
one hand, it implied that President George W. Bush’s two appointees (if
not most of the Republican Justices sitting on the Roberts Court) were
not empathetic, but rather were indifferent to the real-world
consequences of their judging. “Empathy” further conveyed that an
Obama nominee would have the disposition, temperament, and skills to
140. Alito Hearing, supra note 119, at 37 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Schumer); id. at 378,
379, 606 (statement of Sen. Herbert H. Kohl).
141. Obama: Aim for Fundamental Change, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Oct. 3, 2008),
http://www.freep.com/article/20081003/OPINION01/810030434/; Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President on Justice David Souter (May 1, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press
_office/Remarks-By-The-President-On-Justice-David-Souter/.
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be even-handed, to understand all sides of a case, and to try to see the
world (or a case) from the perspectives of other people (or people
different than himself or herself).142 President Obama’s reference to
living “in the real world” conveyed his judicial nominee’s commitment
to immersing herself in the facts of a particular dispute and the pertinent
law.143 The implicit suggestion was that, in contrast to Republican
appointees such Justices Scalia and Thomas,144 an Obama nominee
would not be rigidly committed to some abstract principle or indifferent
to the nuances and significance of the facts of the cases before him or
her. As a White House official described President Obama’s nominee
Sonia Sotomayor, “[h]er judicial philosophy was to follow the rule of
law, [and] apply it in each case . . . . She was not going to be painted as
an ivory-tower judge, but a real-world judge.”145
Throughout the summer of 2009, the Senate’s confirmation
proceedings on Justice Sotomayor’s nomination followed two tracks.146
First, Democratic senators on the Judiciary Committee focused on
Justice Sotomayor’s judicial record as a district and circuit judge.147
They emphasized the significance of her unique experience—as only the
fourth Supreme Court nominee who had previously served as a district
judge, as well as having had the most federal judicial experience of any
nominee in nearly 100 years.148 They further stressed that her record
amply demonstrated her fundamental commitment to focusing on the
facts of a given case and was evidence of her “empathy” as a judge and
her immersion in the “real-world.”149 “Real-world,” or variations of it,
were positively referenced a total of thirty times by Democratic senators
in her confirmation hearings and on the Senate floor.150 They spoke
142. 155 CONG. REC. S8942 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy).
143. Obama: Aim for Fundamental Change, supra note 141; see 155 CONG. REC. S8942 (daily
ed. Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy).
144. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 295, 351-52.
145. Jeffrey Toobin, Bench Press: Are Obama’s Judges Really Liberals?, NEW YORKER, Sept.
21, 2009, at 42, 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. See id.
147. Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 134, at 3 (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy); id. at 56
(statement of Sen. Kirsten E. Gillibrand).
148. Id. (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy); id. at 56 (statement of Sen. Kirsten E. Gillibrand).
The other Supreme Court Justices who had served previously as district court judges were all
nominated to the Court by Republican presidents—Samuel Blatchford (nominated by Chester
Arthur), Edward Sanford (nominated by President Warren Harding), and Charles Whittaker
(nominated by President Dwight Eisenhower). ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 192-93, 270; Samuel
Blatchford, 1882-1893, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC., http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-thecourt/associate-justices/samuel-blatchford-1882-1893/ (last visited July 27, 2012).
149. Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 134, at 37-38 (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse); id.
at 116 (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold).
150. Id. at 41 (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin); id. at 45 (statement of Sen. Amy J.
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positively of Sotomayor’s “empathy” a total of fifty-two times in her
confirmation hearings and on the Senate floor.151 These references were
meant to convey that Justice Sotomayor was not a jurist with her head in
the clouds or enamored with abstract principles, but rather had the skills,
intellect, and temperament to do the gritty, unglamorous, tough work of
meticulously applying the law to the facts in the cases before her.152
Those references also helped to raise the salience of these brands to the
people watching or covering the Senate proceedings.
Second, Republican senators who opposed the Sotomayor
nomination mentioned the “real-world judging” brand only once.153
Ignoring the brand arguably helped to lower or diminish its notoriety or
salience. Instead, they referenced “umpiring” as an ideal of judging
eleven times in the Senate committee hearings and on the Senate
floor.154 Even more so, they took issue with “empathy” as a suitable
criterion for judging, referencing it 128 times in Sotomayor’s
confirmation hearings and on the Senate floor.155 Republican senators
Klobuchar); id. at 116 (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold); 155 CONG. REC. S8916 (daily ed.
Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin); id. at S8925 (statement of Sen. John F. Reed);
id. at S8928 (statement of Sen. John D. Rockefeller); id. at S8929 (statement of Sen. Barbara A.
Mikulski); id. at S8933 (statement of Sen. John F. Kerry), id. at S8944 (statement of Sen. Harry M.
Reid); 155 CONG. REC. S8788-89, S8851 (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy) (daily ed. Aug. 5,
2009); 155 CONG. REC. S8731-32 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy); id.
at S8743 (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse).
151. Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 134, at 37-38 (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse); id.
at 42, 501 (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin); id. at 116 (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold);
id. at 127, 130, 132 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Schumer); id. at 374 (statement of Sen. Arlen
Specter); 155 CONG. REC. S8917 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin); id.
at S8933 (statement of Sen. John F. Kerry); id. at S8942 (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy); 155
CONG. REC. S8789, S8850-51 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy); id. at
S8793 (statement of Sen. Amy J. Klobuchar); id. at S8816 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Schumer);
155 CONG. REC. S8743-44 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2009) (statement of Sen. Charles Whitehouse); id. at
S8754 (statement of Sen. Scott D. Brown).
152. See 155 CONG. REC. S8942 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy).
153. 155 CONG. REC. S8943 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Mitchell J.
McConnell). A search for “real-world judging” in the Congressional Record as spoken by
Republican senators yielded zero results.
154. Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 134, at 7 (statement of Sen. Jefferson B. Sessions); 155
CONG. REC. S8922 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Jefferson B. Sessions); id. at S8939
(statement of Sen. Michael O. Johanns); 155 CONG. REC. S8798 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2009) (statement
of Sen. Christopher S. Bond); id. at S8811 (statement of Sen. Charles P. Roberts); 155 C ONG. REC.
S8733, S8753 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2009) (statement of Sen. Jefferson B. Sessions).
155. Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 134, at 6-8 (statement of Sen. Jefferson B. Sessions); id.
at 12 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch); id. at 17-18 (statement of Charles E. Grassley); id. at 22,
121, 457, 552 (statement of Sen. Jon L. Kyl); id. at 39-40 (statement of Sen. Thomas A. Coburn);
155 CONG. REC. S8899 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch); id. at S8919-20
(statement of Sen. George V. Voinovich); id. at S8923-24 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley);
id. at S8939 (statement of Sen. Michael O. Johanns); id. at S8941 (statement of Sen. Jefferson B.
Sessions); id. at S8943 (statement of Sen. Addison M. McConnell); 155 CONG. REC. S8800 (daily
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suggested that the nominee’s speeches and three of her judicial decisions
showed she was not committed to being a neutral umpire or to
“interpreting the law not making the law.”156
Interestingly, the debate over President Obama’s second nominee to
the Court, Elena Kagan, followed the same two tracks, though with some
minor differences. Kagan spent a day less than Sotomayor as a witness
because Senator Robert Byrd died shortly before the beginning of her
hearings and a day was set aside for his funeral in the midst of her
hearings.157 Her hearings also occurred in the year of a mid-term
election, in which the majority party usually could be expected to lose
seats in Congress.158 Indeed, the Democrats later lost control of the
House and were within a couple seats of losing the Senate.159 While
Republicans on the Judiciary Committee and on the floor largely bashed
“empathy” in judging during the Kagan proceedings,160 Democratic
senators referenced “real-world judging” forty-four times in committee
hearings and floor debate in support of Kagan’s nomination.161
ed. Aug. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn); id. at S8810-11 (statement of Sen. Charles P.
Roberts); id. at S8814 (statement of Sen. Roger F. Wicker); id. at S8822 (statement of Sen. Jon L.
Kyl); id. at S8823, S8825 (statement of Sen. Thomas A. Coburn); id. at S8829-30 (statement of Sen.
Samuel D. Brownback); 155 CONG. REC. S8710 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Addison M. McConnell); id. at S8733, S8753 (statement of Sen. Jefferson B. Sessions); id. at
S8745-46, S8749 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch); id. at S8752 (statement of Sen. James M.
Inhofe); id. at S8780, S8783 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley).
156. See Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the Second Amendment), vacated sub nom. Maloney
v. Rice, 130 S. Ct. 3541, 3541 (2010); Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (dismissing the claim that the city’s failure to use the results of a promotion test violated
Title VII), rev’d 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664, 2681 (2009); Ciszewski v. New York, 279 F. App’x 39, 40
(2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting takings clause challenge to governmental exercise of eminent domain);
Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 134, at 7 (statement of Sen. Jefferson B. Sessions); id. at 18
(statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley).
157. Ann Gerhart, A Winning Performance That Charmed Her Critics, WASH. POST, July 1,
2010, at A4; Christine Delargy, Kagan Hearings to Be Suspended While Byrd Lies in State, CBS
NEWS (June 30, 2010, 12:08 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2102-503544_162-20009290.html;
Sotomayor Still Standing After Testimony, CBS NEWS (July 22, 2009, 6:09 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/07/16/politics/main5163715.shtml.
158. Carl Hulse & Jeff Zeleny, Court Nominee Figures in Midterm Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 2010, at A16; Election 2010: House Map, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/
results/house (last visited July 27, 2012); Election 2010: Senate Map, N.Y. TIMES,
http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/results/senate (last visited July 27, 2012).
159. Election 2010: House Map, supra note 158; Election 2010: Senate Map, supra note 161.
160. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 15 (2010)
[hereinafter Kagan Hearing] (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley); 156 CONG. REC. S6603 (daily
ed. Aug. 3, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jefferson B. Sessions); id. at S6669 (statement of Sen. Charles
E. Grassley).
161. Kagan Hearing, supra note 160, at 4 (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy); id. at 26, 152
(statement of Sen. Charles E. Schumer); id. at 42-44 (statement of Sen. Amy J. Klobuchar); id. at 52
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It is, however, too soon to determine with any certainty the precise
impact of “empathy” or “real-world judging” as brands of judging. It is
possible that the attack on empathy might have buried the term at least in
the foreseeable future, though it is likely that the notion that a judge
strives to see the world from the perspective of others retains broad
social appeal. With respect to “real-world judging,” it is important to
recognize that the Sotomayor and Kagan nominations were not the first
opportunities for senators to emphasize the importance of “real-world
judging” or “realism” in judging. Democratic senators referenced “realworld judging” eleven times in the Roberts proceedings,162 and
Republicans referenced it three times during Senate proceedings on
Justice Alito’s nomination.163 In using the term “real-world judging,”
President Obama and Democratic senators were not only co-opting a
brand that had been used once before (assuming it was previously being
used as a brand), but also trying to refine its narrative. For Democratic
senators, the brand signified the nominee’s positive attributes.164
Second, “real-world judging” as a brand hardly appeared in
newspaper reports on the Sotomayor and Kagan confirmation hearings
(indeed, it made it into only seven stories in major newspapers during
the Sotomayor proceedings and eight stories during the Kagan
proceedings),165 while “empathy” received much more attention in the
media.166 The Republican attacks on “empathy” might have helped to
overshadow, at least for the newspaper media, the positive case being
made for “real-world judging.”
Third, the lack of any real likelihood that Justices Sotomayor and
Kagan would not be confirmed by the Senate deprived their respective
(statement of Sen. John F. Kerry); id. at 183 (statement of Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin); 156 CONG.
REC. S6629 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jeanne Shaheen); 156 CONG. REC. S6699
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 2010) (statement of Sen. Barbara L. Boxer); id. at S6709-13 (statement of Sen.
Patrick J. Leahy); 156 CONG. REC. S6761-62 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2010) (statement of Sen. Charles E.
Schumer); id. at S6817 (statement of Sen. Mark P. Begich); id. at S6821 (statement of Sen. Maria E.
Cantwell); id. at S6824-25 (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy).
162. Roberts Hearing, supra note 118, at 168, 318 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy);
151 CONG. REC. 20,905, 21,274, 21,630 (2005) (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy); id. at
20,908 (statement of Sen. John F. Kerry); id. at 21,274 (statement of Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman).
163. Alito Hearing, supra note 119, at 478 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter); 152 CONG. REC.
165 (2006) (statement of Sen. George V. Voinovich); id. at 197 (statement of Sen. Richard M.
DeWine).
164. Sotomayor Hearing, supra note 134, at 41 (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin); 156
CONG. REC. S6699 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2010) (statement of Sen. Barbara L. Boxer).
165. These results came from two LexisNexis searches. First, a search for “real world” or
“real-world judging” AND Sotomayor between 7/13/2009 and 8/6/2009; second, a search for “real
world” or “real-world judging” and AND Kagan AND Elena between 6/28/2010 and 8/5/2010.
166. See, e.g., Donald B. Ayer, Beyond ‘Balls and Strikes’: Elena Kagan and the Supreme
Court’s Real Work, WASH. POST, June 21, 2010, at A17; Gerhart, supra note 157, at A4.
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proceedings of much drama. Without the drama, the public might not
have been as much engaged with the hearings as they otherwise might
have been (viewership reportedly dropped off after Kagan’s opening
statement and the first day of testimony),167 and the brand might not
have received as much public attention as it could have received under
other circumstances. It is likely that the brand will require more publicity
and promotion in the future to make it possible for it to have meaningful
traction in public discourse on judging.
Last but not least, the constitutional or historical significance of a
particular confirmation proceeding depends a great deal on how it comes
out (as well as on how subsequent senators regard it). To be sure,
Republican Senator John Cornyn of Texas tried to define the
significance of the Sotomayor hearings when he declared that:
[W]e all . . . agreed that judges should interpret the law—and not make
the law. We agreed that judges should rely upon original intent of the
Framers when interpreting the Constitution—and not on foreign or
international law. We agreed that judges should apply the law
faithfully—and not move the law in the direction of their own policy
preferences. We agreed that judges should be impartial—and not pick
168
winners or losers based on . . . what is in the judge’s heart.

Yet, this assertion could not erase the significance of other events,
including the confirmations of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan each by
comfortable margins: 68-31 for Sotomayor169 and 63-37 for Kagan.170
The confirmations of two Supreme Court justices with the particular
attributes that Senator Cornyn and other Republicans had unsuccessfully
opposed are obvious affirmations, rather than rejections of, those
attributes. Thus, their confirmations effectively ratified “real-world
judging” as a brand.
V.

CONCLUSION

Public confidence in judging likely depends on many factors.
Among these is political rhetoric or how national political leaders, party
and interest group leaders, and the media elite talk about the courts,
167. See Michael Wilson, Serenity of Harvard Club Unruffled by Court Hearing, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2010, at A28.
168. Press Release, Senator John Cornyn, Sen. Cornyn Statement in Advance of the Judiciary
Committee’s Vote on Judge Sotomayor (July 28, 2009), http://www.cornyn.senate.gov/public/index
.cfm?p=InNews&ContentRecord_id=c2009a6f-802a-23ad-4f11-43302977cf6e&ContentType_id
=b94acc28-404a-4fc6-b143-a9e15bf92da4&f6c645c7-9e4a-4947-8464-a94cacb4ca65&Group_
id=bf378025-1557-49c1-8f08-c5df1c4313a4&MonthDisplay=7&YearDisplay=2009.
169. Supreme Court Nominations, Present–1789, supra note 2.
170. Id.
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particular judges, judicial nominees, and judging. Such talk is plainly
protected by the First Amendment and made possible by virtue of the
fact that the Constitution vests political leaders with the authority to
address and analyze judging. Such talk also employs branding—the
practice of packaging, characterizing, describing, promoting, or deriding
particular judges and justices, judicial decisions, judicial nominees, and
judging. Branding may be used for political purposes, and it is evident
that political leaders must think such branding matters since they have
employed it with respect to judges or judging throughout American
history. Familiar brands include, but are hardly limited to, “strict
construction,” “activism,” “judicial restraint,” “the Living Constitution,”
“originalists,” “umpires,” “legislating from the bench,” and “real-world
judging.”
Branding has distinct analytical advantages over the social science
methods of framing and labeling. Framing and labeling are wellestablished methods for measuring the connections between rhetoric on
the one hand and the perceived status of a person, practice, or
phenomenon, such as judging, on the other. But, branding is not limited
to motivating or channeling large-scale social movements, like framing,
or solely to negative purposes, like labeling. Branding can be employed
to function like framing and labeling, but it can do more. It also has a
lexicon that neatly fits the reality of contests over, or discussions of,
judges and judging.
We do not know, however, about the actual impact of branding on
public confidence in judging. It could have negative effects. By oversimplifying and even distorting how judges actually do their jobs,
branding might undermine public understanding of judging or the
distinction between law and politics. Moreover, it might sharpen or
exacerbate the differences of opinion that the public might already have
about particular judicial decisions, judges, or styles of judging. Branding
also might have some positive effects, because it might facilitate the
promotion of a particular judge, decision, or style of judging. It can also
attract the public’s attention, and thus draw more attention to
proceedings that it might be good (or interesting) for the public to watch.
Yet, it is conceivable that branding sometimes might have little or no
effects at all; the general public might not care or pay attention to
judicial confirmation hearings or to politicians’ branding of judging,
competing brands might cancel each other out, or branding might
primarily appeal to people whose views are already fixed.
There is no doubt that we could benefit from more empirical
research on constitutional branding. More research is needed to
illuminate the grounds on which the public forms opinions about, or
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gains confidence in, judging. Moreover, such research needs to be
sensitive to word effects, the differences in the results of polls of the
public depending on the terms or concepts about which the public is
being asked. People are likely to express different opinions depending
on whether they are being formed about things that sound more like
specific rulings or judges than the institution.
My hope is that law professors, as well as social scientists, might
consider branding to be a politically motivated act that they can track in
public rhetoric and polling about judging. The results will help us to
improve our understanding of how politics might be used to shape
certain legal constructs and public attitudes about law, politics, and
judging. If, for instance, public opinion shapes outcomes in Supreme
Court decision-making, then knowing how the former came into being
(and what shaped it) will illuminate a good deal about the relationship
between public opinion and the Court’s decisions. But, if the Court
shapes public opinion (about the law and about judging), then knowing
how the Court is able to do this, particularly when people are not reading
its opinions, will broaden our understanding of the relationship between
law and politics. Branding might turn out to be instrumental to the
dynamic interaction between public opinion and the Court, but even if it
does not, this would be a useful thing to know. Hence, branding is a
good place for legal scholars and social scientists to find common
ground in their mutual endeavor to analyze how politics might influence
the law and public attitudes about judging.

